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Abstract 
We use difference-in-difference estimation to study how municipal amalgamation affects 
local government spending and public service levels in the Netherlands. Employing different 
models, different control groups and a number of robustness tests, we find no significant 
effect on aggregate spending. We explore whether this finding is a result of amalgamation 
effects working in opposite directions for different types of municipalities, cancelling each 
other out. However, the amalgamation effect for small municipalities does not differ 
significantly from that for large ones, and the effect for municipalities with homogeneous 
preferences does not differ from that for jurisdictions with heterogeneous preferences. We 
also investigate whether amalgamation leads to better public services instead of lower 
spending. As it turns out, amalgamation reduces spending on administration, but there is no 
corresponding spending increase on public services. Finally, amalgamation does not raise 
house prices, which we would expect were it to improve public services. 
Keywords: municipal amalgamation, jurisdiction size, local spending, public services 
 
1. Introduction 
There is much debate on the optimal size of jurisdictions. According to Oates’ (1972) 
decentralization theorem, smaller jurisdictions are better able to tailor local public goods to 
local preferences and costs. The more heterogeneity, the bigger the gain from 
decentralization. However, internalizing spillovers and reaping economies of scale calls for 
jurisdictions that are sufficiently large.  
The lowest level of territorial government is often formed by municipalities or local 
governments. Average municipality size varies remarkably (Burki et al. 1999; Hoorens 2008; 
Warner 2006): it is low in the Czech Republic (1,640 inhabitants) and France (1,720) and 
high in Venezuela (78,000) and the UK (140,000). Average population size is 7,400 in the 
USA and 5,400 in the EU-countries. 
Local government size is far from constant, however. E.g., Belgium reduced the number of 
municipalities from 2,359 to 596 in 1977, New Zealand restructured over 230 units of local 
government into 74 territorial local authorities in 1989, and Israel amalgamated 23 out of a 
total of 264 municipalities into 11 new municipalities in 2003. More recently, during the 
Danish administrative reform of 2007, 270 municipalities were amalgamated into 98 new 
municipalities. Local government amalgamation is currently being considered in both 
Norway and Finland. 
Surprisingly, the effects of such measures are not well known. In many cases, amalgamation 
is primarily aimed at gaining economies of scale. The empirical evidence underpinning this, 
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however, is weak. This paper studies the effects of municipal amalgamation on local 
expenditures and public service levels in the Netherlands. In many countries, amalgamations 
were part of a national reform that included a vast number of simultaneous amalgamations, 
and that sometimes involved new task assignments as well. The Dutch did not follow this 
“big bang” approach. Instead, in almost every single year in the last decades, a small number 
of amalgamations took place. This makes the Dutch case attractive for econometric research.  
Our analysis is based on three different control groups and several econometric models. 
Whereas previous studies in this field rely on static models, we also use dynamic panel data 
models, since expenditure levels are strongly influenced by budgets set in the previous year. 
In a closely related field, the study of political business cycles, the use of dynamic models is 
standard. We also test whether our results are robust to using two other specifications: a 
model including spatial spending interaction and a model using an instrumental variable that 
reflects the increase in size through amalgamation, instead of just the fact that amalgamation 
took place. Potential cost savings of amalgamations may take a few years to materialize. 
Therefore, we distinguish between short term and long term effects. 
We find no significant effect on total per capita spending before or after amalgamation. 
However, this does not rule out the possibility that amalgamation does in fact affect local 
government spending. That is because amalgamation might affect different groups of 
municipalities differently, resulting in an average effect that is insignificant for the population 
as a whole.  
In the first place, amalgamation might reduce per capita spending of small municipalities 
(operating under economies of scale), but increase spending of large municipalities 
(diseconomies of scale). To test this, we introduce interaction variables to estimate the 
influence of population size on the amalgamation effect. Secondly, we consider preference 
heterogeneity among amalgamating jurisdictions. Large differences in preferences might lead 
to increased spending, if the newly formed municipality adapts the level of each public 
service to the level of the municipality that had the highest standard in that field before 
amalgamation. This might prevent certain municipalities from attaining efficiency gains, 
while municipalities with more homogeneous political preferences would have less difficulty 
in this regard. To study this, we run regressions including interaction variables to estimate the 
influence of political heterogeneity on the amalgamation effect. Finally, we test whether the 
amalgamation effect depends on the number of amalgamating municipalities. 
It is conceivable that amalgamations do result in economies of scale, but that spending levels 
do not go down because the money that has been saved is now spent for other purposes. 
Instead of lowering taxes, local governments may increase service levels. To shed more light 
on this, we first study the amalgamation effect on spending on administration. As 
amalgamation reduces the number of administrators and council members, economies of 
scale are most likely in this spending category. Next, we test whether any reductions in 
spending on administration are matched by corresponding increases in spending on culture & 
recreation. This spending category is directly linked to public services; moreover, it is mostly 
driven by political ambitions, not national guidelines. An increase of public services levels is 
therefore likely to be observable in the share of expenditures on this category.  
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Finally, we investigate whether amalgamation affects the overall level of public services by 
studying its effect on house prices. Through capitalization, improved public services 
accompanied by constant spending levels should be observable through an increase in house 
prices. We first estimate average house prices which are corrected for differences in house 
characteristics by running a hedonic regression based on a panel data set of 1.7 million 
transactions. We then test whether these house prices are affected by amalgamation. 
We begin with a theoretical discussion of the various effects of amalgamation and an 
overview of the results of previous studies (Section 2). Then we briefly describe municipal 
finance and amalgamations in the Netherlands (Section 3). Section 4 describes the model and 
the econometric methods that we deploy. The fifth section gives an overview of the data and 
its sources. Section 6 presents the results of our study of the amalgamation effect on per 
capita municipal spending. Section 7 presents the results of our extended research into 
amalgamation effects for different groups of municipalities, different spending categories and 
the effect on house prices. Section 8 concludes. 
2. Theory and previous research 
Amalgamation of subnational governments may have a number of effects on spending and 
service provision. Here, we present an overview, and we discuss the implications for the 
design of a study of these effects. We also offer a brief review of results of previous empirical 
studies in this field. 
Larger scale 
The most obvious effect of amalgamation is an increase in administrative scale. This may 
lead to improved service quality because specialization and standardization may result in 
more experienced or better educated workers. A small municipality may not be able to 
employ specialists because there is not enough work to keep them busy. Moreover, larger 
jurisdictions may be able to attract better administrators, and thus improve service levels or 
take on responsibilities previously avoided. Another positive effect is that scaling up will 
reduce spillovers, which will promote allocative efficiency (Oates, 1972). On the other hand, 
governance may be weakened, as the influence of voters may be diminished as jurisdictions 
grow larger (Lassen and Serritzlew, 2011). Moreover, political yardstick competition may be 
less effective as the number of jurisdictions is reduced (Allers, 2012). This might reduce both 
allocative and productive efficiency. 
Amalgamation is often inspired by the hope that increased scale will improve productive 
efficiency. That is because scaling up may promote specialization, i.e, an improved division 
of labor. Moreover, it enables fixed costs to be spread over a larger output. On the other hand, 
a larger scale may raise agency and information costs. Large organizations require more 
planning, monitoring and reporting than small ones. Scale effects are likely to materialize 
over a number of years. To cover them fully, a long research period is essential. 
As a result of these conflicting effects, the per capita cost of public services is often assumed 
to be u-shaped, although firm empirical evidence seems to be lacking. Such a u-curve reflects 
economies of scale (downward sloping expenditures per capita) for units below a certain 
critical scale, at which per capita expenditures are at a minimum. Organizations with a larger 
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scale would then face diseconomies of scale. With u-shaped costs, the effect of amalgamation 
on production efficiency would be negative for small jurisdictions (scale after amalgamation 
< optimal scale) and positive for larger jurisdictions. Theoretically, economies and 
diseconomies of scale might even cancel out in an aggregate analysis, leading to an 
insignificant effect on average. Existing empirical studies do not seem to consider this 
possibility. Moreover, they seem to ignore that it is increase in scale, not amalgamation per 
se, that drives economies of scale. 
Note that economies of scale apply to production units, not necessarily organizational units. 
E.g., many local governments are responsible for refuse collection, but contract this out to 
firms or intermunicipal organizations (e.g., Bel et al. 2010). In such a case, amalgamating 
municipalities will not increase scale of production, and economies of scale are unlikely to 
occur. Economies of scale are most likely in administration, because the number of 
administrators and council members does not rise proportionally with population size. Blom-
Hansen et al. (2012) and Moisio and Uusitalo (2013) found evidence of lower expenditures 
on administration in amalgamated municipalities in Denmark and Finland, respectively. 
Scaling up organizations operating under economies of scale may result in lower spending, 
higher service levels (increase in quality or quantity), or both. If public services become 
cheaper to produce, the optimal service level normally rises (substitution effect; Buettner and 
Holm-Hadulla 2013). Moreover, bureaucrats might be reluctant to reduce spending, e.g., as a 
result of budget maximizing behavior (Niskanen, 1971). On the other hand, a reduction in 
spending may be the result of deteriorating public services. Thus, studying spending levels 
alone is insufficient to judge whether amalgamation is successful. 
Fox and Gurley (2006) and Holzer (2009) review the literature on sub-national government 
amalgamations. Most of the papers reviewed there are case studies; any empirical research 
uses descriptive statistics at best. They conclude that the evidence is mixed: it is unclear 
whether amalgamations improve efficiency. Econometric analyses also have mixed results. 
Some studies point to higher spending after amalgamation (Lüchinger and Stutzer 2002, 
studying Switzerland; Hansen 2011, Denmark; Moisio and Uusitalo 2013, Finland), whereas 
others find that amalgamation reduces spending (Reingewertz 2012, Israel; Blesse and 
Baskaran 2013, Germany). 
Only two studies we know of also check whether lower spending is associated with lower 
service levels. To this end, Reingewertz (2012) uses net migration, housing constructions, 
birth rate, school test results and average class size as indicators of service levels; Blesse and 
Baskaran (2013) use birth rates, immigration and the logarithmized sum of per capita 
municipal traffic and recreational area. Such exercises are useful: lower spending because of 
lower service levels instead of more efficiency is not the desired outcome of amalgamation. 
However, the output indicators that have been used seem rather arbitrary; selected because of 
availability, not out of conviction that they cover the full range of the multi-service 
jurisdictions that municipalities are. As an alternative to this approach, the effects of 
amalgamation on efficiency in specific fields may be studied. In this vein, Rouse and Putterill 
(2005) use data envelopment analysis (DEA) to test whether amalgamation in New Zealand 
increased efficiency in highway maintenance (it didn’t). 
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Uniform service levels 
Jurisdictions have very limited scope to vary service levels within their boundaries. Thus, 
amalgamation normally requires unifying different service levels. In case of preference 
heterogeneity among the inhabitants of the merging jurisdictions, the result is reduced 
allocative efficiency. That is because the ability to tailor local services to local demand, 
which is the basic argument for decentralization (Oates, 1972), is reduced.  
Preference heterogeneity among amalgamating municipalities might also influence the effect 
of amalgamation on spending. In democracies, differences in preferences will be reflected by 
differences in public services. Citizens will be disappointed if services they value are 
downgraded after amalgamation. The local government may therefore be tempted to adopt, 
for each service, the highest standard that existed before amalgamation (Park 2013). E.g., the 
merger of a municipality which spends a lot on social services with a municipality that has a 
high quality road network may result in a municipality which spends a lot on both social 
services and roads. This would raise per capita spending, possibly more than economies of 
scale could lower it. Correspondingly, for amalgamating municipalities with more 
homogeneous preferences, there might be less need to adjust public service levels after 
amalgamation, and economies of scale could lead to lower spending. Both effects might even 
cancel out in an aggregate analysis, leading to an insignificant effect on average. The current 
literature does not seem to address this issue. 
Temporary effects 
Amalgamation should be expected to have temporary effects as well. First, there will be the 
costs of restructuring different parts of the municipal organizations. New office buildings 
might be needed, IT-systems have to be integrated, regulations must be harmonized, and so 
on. Amalgamation and the uncertainties surrounding it may also have disruptive effects on 
managerial behavior and organizational outcomes. Restructuring costs will normally start 
well before the official amalgamation date, and continue for several years afterwards. It 
seems likely that these costs rise with the number of amalgamating jurisdictions. Andrews 
and Boyne (2012) found that spending of local governments in England went up while 
performance and value for money went down before they were merged in 2009. 
Restructuring costs are likely to depend on the size of the amalgamating jurisdictions. 
Roughly speaking, amalgamations come in two types. The first type involves municipalities 
which do not differ too much in size (a “merger of equals”). The second type of 
amalgamation is characterized by the absorption of a small municipality into a big neighbor. 
In the Netherlands, the first type, which we will denote simply by “amalgamations”, occurs 
far more often than the second, denoted as “annexations”. It is not at all clear that both types 
have the same effects on the local budget. For one thing, amalgamations require setting up 
new organizational structures, whereas annexations do not. Empirical studies should take this 
into account. 
Spending might be higher in jurisdictions knowing they will soon be merged as a result of a 
common pool effect. Then, municipalities engage in opportunistic behavior and decide to 
increase spending and/or accumulate debt in the years preceding amalgamation in order to 
shift part of the burden onto residents of their future amalgamation partners. Empirical 
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evidence for such an effect is reported by Tyrefors Hinnerich (2009), Jordahl and Liang 
(2009), Blom-Hansen (2010), Hansen (2014) and Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2013). But, as we 
have seen, a common pool effect is only one possible explanation for rising expenditures or 
debt preceding amalgamation. Although restructuring costs are not considered by these 
authors, some find that the budgetary effects are linked to the size of the common pool 
(Tyrefors Hinnerich, 2009; Hansen, 2014; Saarimaa and Tukiainen, 2013), which supports the 
opportunistic behavior hypothesis. 
Positive temporary effects may exist as well. Existing organizations usually have well 
established ways of doing things, which might have become outdated. Amalgamation forces 
organizations to reconsider procedures and operations, possibly resulting in the adoption of 
more efficiency practices (Hansen et al., 2014). 
3. Municipalities and amalgamations in the Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, there are three territorial layers of government: in addition to the national 
government, the country is divided into 12 provinces and into 418 municipalities (in 2011). 
All three tiers cover the entire country. All provinces have more or less the same set of tasks 
and responsibilities, as do all municipalities. About two thirds of Dutch municipalities’ 
revenues consists of (mostly non-matching) grants from the central government. Taxes and 
levies account for approximately 15 percent of municipal revenues. Municipalities use 
accrual accounting, and local budgets must be balanced.  
 
Figure 1. Number of municipalities subject to amalgamation and average municipal population 
size 
 
The number of municipalities has been steadily declining for a long time. As a result, Dutch 
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compared with those in other countries. In 1997-2011, our research period, the number of 
municipalities was reduced by 154. Often, two municipalities were merged, but the number of 
municipalities involved in an amalgamation ranges from two to six. Most municipalities 
selected for amalgamation had between 5,000 and 20,000 inhabitants (234 out of 329). After 
amalgamation, population size often lies in the range 20,000 – 50,000 (86 out of 122). 
Most amalgamations concern municipalities of similar size. The number of annexations is too 
small for meaningful statistical analysis. Therefore, we limit our analysis to amalgamations 
without a dominant partner and drop municipalities involved in annexations from our dataset. 
As a cutoff point we choose a population share of 85 percent for the biggest partner, thus 
eliminating 17 municipalities from our dataset. Lowering this cutoff point to 80 percent does 
not change our findings. 
The final decision to amalgamate municipalities is made by the national parliament, usually 
in the year preceding amalgamation. Several years of debate and preparations precede any 
amalgamation. Amalgamation may occur at the request of the municipalities concerned, but 
can also be against their will. Often, it is hard to say to what extent amalgamation is voluntary 
or mandatory. Provinces play an important role here, initializing and coordinating 
amalgamations. Some provinces have been more active in this respect than others. This is one 
of the reasons why amalgamated municipalities are not spread out evenly across the country 
(see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Municipalities formed through amalgamation, 1997-2011 







Dropped from analysis (31)
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Obviously, local issues are important factors influencing the probability of amalgamation. In 
order to learn more about the general determinants of amalgamation, we ran a logistic 
regression on data for 2000. The dependent variable was a dummy that took the value one if 
the municipality was to be amalgamated in 2001-2011. Not surprisingly, smaller 
municipalities turn out to be more likely to amalgamate. A second determinant, also highly 
significant, is density, measured as the average number of addresses per square kilometer. 
Higher density implies a bigger likelihood of amalgamation. Finally, several province 
dummies are significant, as expected.  
4. Research setup 
Identification strategy 
In order to study the effects of amalgamation, we use difference-in-difference estimation, 
comparing changes in spending of amalgamated municipalities (the treatment group) with 
those of a control group of municipalities that were not amalgamated. Difference-in-
difference estimation has been applied to study the effects of amalgamations before by 
Lüchinger and Stutzer (2002), Tyrefors Hinnerich (2009), Jordahl and Liang (2010), 
Reingewertz (2012) and Blesse and Baskaran (2013). Like these authors, we exploit the fact 
that some municipalities were amalgamated and others were not. The staggered nature of the 
Dutch amalgamations allows us to also utilize fact that amalgamations took place in different 
years. 
An important assumption in difference-in-difference estimation is that the error term is 
uncorrelated with the treatment status. Obviously, selection for amalgamation is not random. 
To control for the forces that drive selection, an instrumental variables approach may 
sometimes be used. This would require an instrument that influences selection for 
amalgamation, but not budgetary outcomes. It is unlikely that such an instrument exists. We 
take an alternative approach: including all relevant variables affecting selection in the 
budgetary regressions as controls. Although one can never be sure that all relevant variables 
have been included, many of these are likely to be relatively time-invariant, like, e.g., location 
within a certain province. Including municipal and year fixed effects takes care of these. We 
control for time-variant variables affecting selection by including municipality-specific time 
trends and a number of control variables. 
A second important assumption is that the treatment group and the control group consist of 
municipalities with similar budgetary trends. Both groups should consist of comparable 
municipalities. We use three different control groups. The first control group consists of all 
municipalities that were not amalgamated, or that were amalgamated but in a different year. 
This control group is not entirely satisfactory, as amalgamated municipalities have different 
characteristics from non-amalgamated municipalities. For our second control group, we use 
municipalities that were amalgamated, but in a different year. This control group resembles 
the treatment group well. As a last control group, following Reingewertz (2012), we add to 
the second control group 34 municipalities that were set to amalgamate, but have, for political 





Since we have budgetary data on 418 municipalities for a period up to 12 years, we have an 
opportunity to study amalgamation effects using a panel data model into which we can 
introduce a number of amalgamation dummies. We first explain our choice of the type of 
panel data model. 
We start our analysis with a fixed effects model: 
 =  + 	
 +  +  +  (1) 
where  is the dependent variable,  is the vector of (strictly exogenous) explanatory 
variables,  is a time scalar and 	
 is a column vector of ones,  is an unobserved individual 
effect, t is a linear time trend that is allowed a municipality-specific effect and  is an 
unobserved white noise disturbance. The subscript i denotes municipalities (i = 1…n), the 
subscript t denotes years.  
 
Previous econometric studies of amalgamations rely on static models. In the related literature 
on political business cycles, however, dynamic models are common (e.g. Brender and 
Drazen, 2005; Alt and Lassen, 2006). This is motivated by the nature of the dependent 
variable, being local expenditures. While these are partly discretionary and as such can be 
changed from year to year, spending in many categories changes only gradually. First, 
because national regulations and popular expectations often oblige municipalities to deliver 
certain services, as a result of which part of total spending is pre-committed (Allers and 
Elhorst, 2011). Secondly, spending decisions involve rather complex trade-offs between 
political priorities. The previous year’s budget often serves as a point of reference, and only 
limited changes are made every year (Bennett, 1984). Moreover, the apparatus of government 
is largely fixed in the short term. Hence, budgetary decision-making is likely to be 
incremental (Wildavsky, 1964). Therefore, we supplement our static analysis with a dynamic 
model, which takes into account the one year lag of the dependent variable.  
In our dataset, the number of jurisdictions (387) is relatively large whereas the time 
dimension (T=11)1 is rather small. Using dummy variables (LSDV) to estimate individual 
effects in a dynamic model then results in biased estimates. Judson and Owen (1999) compare 
various estimation methods that have been developed for cases with limited T. They conclude 
that the Corrected Least Squares Dummy Variable (CLSDV) method (Kiviet 1995; 1999) is 
the best choice. We use this method, in Bruno’s (2005) implementation to deal with the fact 
that our panel is unbalanced.2 The method is based on a standard dynamic panel data model: 
 = , +  + 	
 +  +  (2) 
The initial, biased estimations of ,   are obtained employing the Arellano and Bond-
estimator (1991). The CLSDV method then corrects any bias in the observed values of  and 
. Standard errors are approximated by a bootstrap algorithm with fifty repetitions. Since no 
                                            
1
 We have expenditure data for 2002-2013. Because we include a lagged dependent variable, we lose one year in our 
regressions. 
2
 We ran our regressions in Stata using the xtlsdvc command. 
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information on the goodness of fit of the CLSDV model is available, we have rerun all 
regressions as a regular LSDV test with fixed effects (including a lagged dependent variable), 
and provide the R2 of these estimations. Although these values give no accurate measure of 
the goodness of fit of the CLSDV model, they do give a good indication of the relative 
goodness of fit of the various CLSDV regressions. However, they are not comparable with 
the R2 values given for the static regressions. 
The dependent variables and the control variables are expressed in logs.3 That is because we 
expect amalgamation to have a proportional effect on spending, if at all, not a constant effect. 
In order to study the effects of amalgamations, we first extend models (1) and (2) to include a 
number of amalgamation dummies. This is the standard approach in the literature. Because 
we expect short term effects to differ from long term effects, and pre-amalgamation effects 
from post-amalgamation effects, we use four different amalgamation dummies, Apre, A0-3, A4-
10, and A11+, which take the value of 1 in the corresponding periods running from three years 
before amalgamation to eleven or more years after. Amalgamations take effect on the 1st of 
January of a certain year and that year is marked as the amalgamation year where the dummy 
A0-3 takes the value of 1 for the first time.  
Robustness tests 
Possible economies of scale effect are related to increase of scale, not to amalgamation as 
such. Therefore, as a robustness test, we use an instrumental variable approach to test whether 
increase in size through amalgamation affects spending. In this model, we introduce the 
variable average population per jurisdiction, which before amalgamation is calculated as the 
population of the amalgamated municipality divided by the number of amalgamating 
jurisdictions. After amalgamation, it is equal to the population. This average population per 
jurisdiction is instrumented on a dummy indicating whether a municipality has been 
amalgamated, and used as an explanatory variable. At the moment of amalgamation, average 
population increases (e.g., it doubles when two municipalities amalgamate). This variable 
reflects that it is increase in size through amalgamation, not amalgamation as such, that is 
expected to yield economies of scale.  
As a second robustness test, we use a dynamic model which is extended to include spatial 
interaction effects.4 Allers and Elhorst (2011) found evidence of expenditure mimicking 
among Dutch local governments. Failure to include this could lead to omitted variable bias. 
Elhorst (2010) compares a number of different dynamic panel models with spatial interaction 
effects, and specifically evaluates their performance for panels with a small time dimension 
(T=5). He finds that the bias-corrected LSDV (BCLSDV) method from Yu, De Jong and Lee 
(2008) roughly decimates the bias that is found when using a standard LSDV method. This 
bias is even lower if the time dimension is larger than 5, as in our case. Therefore we will use 
this model, for which the econometric specification is: 
 = , +  +  +  + 	
 +  +  (3) 
                                            
3
 One exception is made for ideology of the coalition, since this variable can take a value of zero. 
4
 Different spatial interaction models exist. A spatial lag model is chosen here because we know from Allers and Elhorst 
(2011) that we should expect direct spatial interactions between Dutch municipalities. 
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 is an n x n spatial weights matrix which is non-stochastic and generates the spatial 
dependence among cross sectional units . As each row sums to one,  is the average of 
 in neighboring municipalities. Spatial interaction is included both for the dependent 
variable in the present year t and in the previous year t-1. No indicator for goodness of fit is 
available for this estimator. As with the dynamic non-spatial model, we extend model (3) to 
include a number of amalgamations dummies, which are defined above. 
Extended analysis 
We extend the basic analysis described above in two ways. First, based on theory, we would 
expect to see different amalgamation effects on small and large municipalities, on 
municipalities with homogeneous and heterogeneous preferences, and on amalgamations of 
few and many jurisdictions. Therefore, we estimate the influence of both population size, 
preference heterogeneity and number of amalgamating jurisdictions on the amalgamation 
effect. To this end, we introduce interaction dummies. 
Secondly, we include service levels into the analysis. Efficiency gains can be used to improve 
public services instead of reducing spending. Moreover, reduced spending might be the result 
of declining service levels instead of increased efficiency. Economies of scale are most likely 
in administration. We first test whether per capita spending in administration as a share of 
total spending goes down after amalgamation, and whether there is a corresponding spending 
increase in policy fields more directly associated with public service provision.  
In addition, we investigate whether amalgamation might raise the overall level of public 
services. If amalgamated municipalities improve service levels, this should have made them 
more attractive to live in, ceteris paribus. Housing supply in the Netherlands is inelastic 
(Vermeulen and Rouwendal, 2007). If a municipality becomes more attractive, local demand 
for housing will rise, resulting in rising house prices (Oates, 1969; Brueckner, 1979). A recent 
study indicates that intergovernmental grants in the Netherlands are fully capitalized into 
house prices (Allers and Vermeulen, 2013). We would expect the same to happen with funds 
that become available as a result of economies of scale. Thus, changes in quality-adjusted 
average house prices per municipality and per year seem a better indicator for changes in 
service levels that variables like birth rate that have been used in some previous studies.  
We first ran a hedonic regression based on a panel data set which, for 1.7 million transactions 
in 1995-2013, contains sale prices and dates along with a rich set of house characteristics 
(number of rooms, floors, kitchens, bathrooms; year of construction, proximity of busy roads, 
garden orientation, etc.).5 We have then used the regression results to estimate the average 
house price per municipality and per year, keeping every other variable constant. The result is 
a price reflecting the value of a location in a particular municipality in a particular year. We 
next take this average house price as the dependent variable in a regression with 
amalgamation dummies, fixed effects, year effects and individual municipality trends on the 
right hand side. 
                                            
5
 Data have been kindly made available by the Dutch Association of Realtors (Nederlandse Vereniging van Makelaars o.g. en 




We have spending data for 2002-2013. We rebuilt the dataset in such a way that all 
amalgamations are retroactively applied to the data. Thus, we organize our data as if all 
amalgamations had been implemented by 2002. We have information on amalgamations in 
1997-2013. We drop five municipalities that were amalgamated twice in this period from our 
dataset, along with the fourteen municipalities that amalgamated in 2012 and 2013. This 
leaves us spending data for 387 municipalities, of which 101 were created through 
amalgamation, 34 were selected for amalgamation but left intact (“almost amalgamated”) and 
252 were not amalgamated or almost amalgamated. Figure 2 shows the geographical 
distribution of these groups. 
The main dependent budgetary variable is total per capita expenditures. In section 7, we also 
consider spending in separate policy fields. We exclude expenditures on land purchases and 
land development from total expenditures. In some cases, these form a considerable part of 
total expenditures, but they are highly volatile due to their incidental nature, and they are not 
relevant for our study. Spending data is provided by Statistics Netherlands. Unfortunately, 
data is missing for some municipalities in some years. As a result, we have an unbalanced 
panel. Amounts are expressed in euros of 2013 using the consumer price index. 
The matrix Xit consists of seven control variables. As described above, central government 
grants constitute a large part of total municipal income. We include per capita amounts of the 
general, non-earmarked equalization grant. Data on earmarked intergovernmental grants are 
only available from 2010 onward. However, the correlation between the general grant and the 
total of other intergovernmental grants is very high (Allers and Van Gelder, 2013). Thus, the 
general grant seems to be an adequate proxy for the total size of central government grants.6 
As this is an equalization grant, allocated through a formula containing more than 50 
demographic, physical and other local characteristics outside the control of the local 
government, this variable indirectly controls for a great number of variables that might 
influence both spending and selection for amalgamation. 
The second control variable is the number of inhabitants. As we have seen, this is one of the 
determinants of selection for amalgamation. For this reason alone we need to include it. A 
different reason for inclusion is that spending may not grow proportionately to population 
size. Just like amalgamation, autonomous population growth results in larger municipalities 
which may lead to economies of scale. Because density also turned out to influence the 
probability of amalgamation (see above), we include this variable as well. Province dummies 
also have significant effects on the probability of being selected for amalgamation, but these 
are superfluous as we include municipal fixed effects.7 
                                            
6
 The allocation formula of the general grant awards a temporarily higher grant for amalgamated municipalities (in the first 
four years). This is meant to help them finance the transition costs which follow amalgamation. Inclusion of control variables 
that are affected by the treatment should normally be avoided. That is because indirect effects of the treatment working 
through such controls may load on these controls, downwardly biasing the estimates of the treatment effect. In this case, 
amalgamation raises the grant, as a result of which spending is likely to go up. By including the general grant we control for 
this indirect effect. Nevertheless, we include the grant variable, because grants are the most important source of municipal 
revenue. Changes in grants not due to amalgamations should therefore be controlled for. 
7
 In the period under study, provincial boundaries have not changed.  
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The fourth control variable is the sum of the number of unemployment benefits and the 
number of social welfare benefits per capita. This variable is a good indicator of the social 
structure of the municipality. Moreover, social welfare benefits are paid out of the municipal 
budget and as a result can influence expenditures.  
As a fifth control variable we use the political ideology of the municipal government. For 
each municipality, we divide the council seats held by the coalition parties into left-wing, 
right-wing and other parties. We measure ideology as the share of left-wing parties on a scale 
from 0 to 1. This is done by counting the number of seats for left wing parties, adding one 
half of the seats of parties of “neutral” ideology (e.g. local parties without a clear ideological 
disposition) and dividing the sum by the total number of coalition seats.8 In accordance with 
partisan theory (for Dutch evidence, see Allers et al. 2001), we expect government 
expenditures to increase when left wing parties are in charge and vice versa.  
Two more political variables are included to control for differences in the political power to 
influence spending: the political concentration of the municipal council (Herfindahl index) 
and the share of council seats taken by the parties that form the ruling coalition. 
Amalgamations are sometimes accompanied by local elections, depending on whether they 
take place in or near national election years.9 In order to control for possible political budget 
cycle effects we include three election dummies: for the election year itself as well as for the 
year before elections and the year after. 
Table 1 compares dependent variables and control variables for different control groups. The 
source of the first four control variables is Statistics Netherlands. Data on the political 
variables is available from COELO. The spatial weight matrix   is built on municipal border 
information from Statistics Netherlands. It is based on queen contiguity, meaning that 
municipalities are marked as neighbors if they share at least one border point.  
  
                                            
8
 The national parties PvdA (social democrats), Groen Links (the green left), SP (socialist party), D66 (left wing liberals) and 
CU (social christians) are counted as left wing parties, whereas VVD (conservative liberals), CDA (christian democrats) and 
SGP (orthodox christians) are counted as right wing parties. Local parties that have a clear right or left wing signature are 
treated accordingly. 
9
 Normally, local elections take place every four years in all municipalities.  
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Number of observations 4,433 3,319 1,114 1,507 




Figure 3 presents our data graphically. The upper part of Figure 3 shows per capita municipal 
spending for the different control groups. Differences between amalgamated municipalities 
on the one hand and amalgamated or almost amalgamated municipalities on the other hand 
are so small they are hardly visible. Non-amalgamated municipalities show the same pattern, 
but at a higher level. The middle part and the lower part of Figure 3, respectively, show the 
shares of culture & recreation and of administration in total spending. For the first, no clear 
trend is discernible. The share of administration is more or less constant for not amalgamated 
municipalities, but falls roughly one percent point for (almost) amalgamated municipalities. 
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Figure 3. Total per capita spending (euros of 2013) and shares of spending on administration 
and on culture & recreation for different groups of municipalities 
 
Econometric analysis 
Table 2 reports regression results of total expenditures, using as a control group 
municipalities that were amalgamated in a different year, or that had been selected for 
amalgamation but were left intact. Different control groups will be introduced in Table 3.  
The dependent variables and the control variables are expressed in logs. As a result, the 
coefficients of continuous variables can be interpreted as elasticities. Before interpreting the 
coefficient of a dummy variable, one must take the exponent. For example, if the coefficient 
on a dummy is 0.20, then, when the dummy takes the value 1, the dependent variable is 22 
percent larger than otherwise (. = 1.22).  
All regressions include fixed effects at the municipal level, to control for unobserved time-
invariant local characteristics. The first three columns in Table 2 present regressions of the 
basic static panel model of total spending. There is no lagged dependent variable yet, which 
makes these results more or less comparable with those of previous studies. In the first 
regression we include only amalgamation dummies, a constant, and control variables. This 
renders insignificant amalgamation effects before and shortly after amalgamation, but the 
medium and long term effects are highly significant. This significance disappears after adding 
year dummies (Column 2) that control for nationwide temporal effects, like law changes or 
national budget cuts that affect the local playing field. Adding municipality-specific linear 
time trends (Column 3) does not have much impact, although one (negative) pre-
amalgamation effect now borders on significance. Theoretically, we would expect a pre-
amalgamation effect to be positive. For the periods after amalgamation, amalgamation effects 
















Share of Administration (left hand axis)
Share of Culture & recreation (left hand axis)
Total per capita spending (right hand axis)
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Baskaran, 2013) or higher spending (Lüchinger and Stutzer 2002; Hansen, 2011; Moisio and 
Uusitalo, 2013) after amalgamation. 
Columns (4) and (5) in Table 2 present the results of the dynamic regression model. Per 
capita municipal spending is positively affected by density and negatively by population size, 
as expected, and the lagged dependent is highly significant. However, whether year dummies 




Table 2: Regressions of total per capita spending, static and dynamic panel models 
Control group Amalgamated or almost amalgamated 
Model Static Static Static Dynamic Dynamic 
Regression number 1 2 3 4 5 
Lagged dependent    0.43*** 0.47*** 
    (13.66) (12.97) 
General grant 0.46*** 0.24* -0.03 0.32*** 0.14 
 (8.93) (1.75) (-0.29) (8.33) (1.32) 
Population -1.05*** -1.09*** -1.24*** -0.47** -0.57*** 
 (-4.79) (-4.71) (-3.98) (-2.27) (-2.74) 
Density 0.97*** 0.73*** 0.24 0.42** 0.49** 
 (6.46) (3.32) (1.02) (2.48) (2.45) 
Unemployment -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.03*** -0.00 
Benefits (-1.50) (-1.07) (-0.75) (-2.68) (-0.43) 
Ideology (left) 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 
 (1.22) (0.14) (0.53) (1.62) (0.17) 
Concentration  0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.00 
in council (0.94) (0.81) (-1.26) (0.55) (0.09) 
Coalition power -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
in council (-0.88) (-0.85) (0.08) (-0.57) (-0.79) 
Pre-election year 0.03*** 0.01 0.02 0.03*** -0.01 
 (4.88) (0.64) (1.06) (3.19) (-0.22) 
Election year -0.04*** 0.05** 0.05** -0.02** 0.02 
 (-3.25) (2.45) (2.49) (-2.35) (0.60) 
Post-election year -0.03*** 0.02 0.02* -0.02** 0.01 
 (-3.69) (1.57) (1.85) (-2.06) (0.43) 
Apre -0.00 -0.03 -0.04* -0.02 -0.03 
 (-0.17) (-1.57) (-1.83) (-0.98) (-1.18) 
A0-3 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.32) (0.27) (-0.99) (-0.04) (0.03) 
A4-10 0.08*** 0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (2.95) (1.27) (-0.38) (0.58) (0.27) 
A11+ 0.12*** 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.02 
 (3.56) (1.32) (0.11) (0.71) (0.35) 
Year effects No Yes Yes No Yes 
Municipal fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal time trends No No Yes No No 
Observations 1,542 1,542 1,542 1,341 1,341 
Municipalities 135 135 135 135 135 
R2 (within)
 
0.40 0.46 0.64   
Pseudo-R2    0.48 0.51 
T-values between parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered by municipality. Variables are 
expressed in logs. * denotes significance at the 10% confidence level, ** significance at the 5% confidence 
level, and *** significance at the 1% confidence level.
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Table 3: Regressions of total per capita spending: alternative control groups  
Model Static Static Static Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic 
Control group Amalgamated 
or almost 
amalgamated 




Regression number 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Lagged dependent    0.47*** 0.42*** 0.65*** 
    (12.97) (7.56) (31.89) 
General grant -0.03 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.19 0.13*** 
 (-0.29) (0.32) (1.04) (1.32) (1.41) (2.96) 
Population -1.24*** -1.50*** -0.43** -0.57*** -0.67*** -0.36*** 
 (-3.98) (-3.86) (-2.24) (-2.74) (-2.69) (-4.48) 
Density 0.24 0.20 -0.08 0.49** 0.51** 0.16** 
 (1.02) (0.72) (-0.65) (2.45) (2.00) (2.14) 
Unemployment -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 
Benefits (-0.75) (0.42) (-1.01) (-0.43) (0.47) (-0.43) 
Ideology (left) 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.53) (0.39) (-1.28) (0.17) (0.03) (-0.61) 
Concentration  -0.04 -0.02 -0.03* 0.00 0.00 -0.02 
in council (-1.26) (-0.43) (-1.88) (0.09) (0.14) (-1.46) 
Coalition power 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 
in council (0.08) (-0.60) (0.55) (-0.79) (-0.87) (0.05) 
Pre-election year 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
 (1.06) (0.92) (1.15) (-0.22) (-0.22) (-0.12) 
Election year 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (2.49) (2.10) (2.57) (0.60) (0.63) (0.84) 
Post-election year 0.02* 0.02 0.02* 0.01 0.01 0.00 
 (1.85) (1.35) (1.86) (0.43) (0.26) (0.13) 
Apre -0.04* -0.05** -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
 (-1.83) (-2.19) (-1.50) (-1.18) (-1.11) (-1.24) 
A0-3 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (-0.99) (-1.39) (-0.73) (0.03) (0.36) (0.37) 
A4-10 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 
 (-0.38) (-0.62) (0.08) (0.27) (0.92) (0.70) 
A11+ 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 
 (0.11) (0.01) (0.65) (0.35) (1.18) (0.93) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal fixed eff.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal time trends Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Observations 1,542 1,145 4,491 1,341 987 3,983 
Municipalities 135 101 387 135 101 387 
R2 0.64 0.61 0.67    
Pseudo-R2 (within)    0.51 0.48 0.56 
T-values between parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered by municipality. Variables are expressed in logs. * 






Table 2 suggests that there are no significant amalgamation effects on total local government 
spending. It is important to check the robustness of these findings. First, we repeated the 
analyses in Table 2 in three different wasy: including annexations (amalgamations with a 
dominant partner, Section 2); using dummies A4-8 and A9+ instead of A4-10 and A11+, 
respectively, and using the ideology of the entire local council, instead of only those parties 
that form the ruling coalition. None of this changes our results significantly. 
Next, in Table 3, we present regression results for different control groups. Columns (6) and 
(9) in Table 3 match Columns (3) and (5) in Table 2. In Columns (7) and (10) we remove the 
almost amalgamated municipalities from the control group, leaving only the municipalities 
that have indeed been amalgamated. In Columns (8) and (12) we include all municipalities, 
except for those municipalities that have been dropped from the dataset altogether (see 
above). The negative pre-amalgamation effect in the static model is significant when using 
the second control group (Amalgamated). This contradicts theoretical expectations of possible 
common pool effects and reorganization costs. However, whichever control groups is used, 
the dynamic model does not yield any significant amalgamation effects. 
As a further robustness test, we use two alternative models. Table 4 presents results of an 
instrumental variable approach. Here, instead of Apre, A0-3, A4-10, and A11+, we use average 
population per jurisdiction, defined in Section 4, as dependent variable of interest. This 
variable reflects that it is the increase in size through amalgamation, not amalgamation as 
such, that is expected to yield economies of scale. We instrument this variable on a simple 
dummy (Amalgamated), which takes the value of one in the years after a municipality has 
been amalgamated. As we see in first stage regression results, the coefficient for the dummy 
variable Amalgamated is highly significant. The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic indicates that 
these estimates are strongly identified. A possible amalgamation effect should now be 
observable in the coefficient of average population per jurisdiction. However, this is not the 
case (Column 12). 
Next, we check whether inclusion of spatial interaction effects affects the outcomes of the 
dynamic model, using the estimator of Yu, De Jong and Lee (2008). We include control 
variables, year dummies and municipal fixed effects. We run the spatial dynamic model for 
the entire sample. Thus, the control group consists of municipalities that were not 
amalgamated, or that were amalgamated in a different year. Reducing the sample to limit the 
control group would result in too many geographical gaps to make spatial analysis useful. 
Many municipalities would have no or few neighbors included in the analysis. Table 5 
presents the results. Column (18) matches Column (11) in Table 3. Column (19) shows the 
results of the same model, but for a balanced panel. These results can be compared with those 
of the model including a spatial lag in Column (20), which can only be estimated for balanced 
panels. The coefficient for the spatial lag is significantly positive. Per capita spending 
increases with 1 percent when the average level of per capita spending in neighboring 
municipalities increases with 10 percent. However, the introduction of this effect into the 
model does not affect our results with regard to the amalgamation effects. These remain 
insignificant. We take this as evidence that the absence of any effect of amalgamation we find 
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in the dynamic models in Tables 2 and 3 does not result from omitting spatial interaction 
from the model. 
 
Table 4: Regressions of total per capita spending: instrumental variable approach 
Control group Amalgamated or almost amalgamated 
 IV estimate 1st stage regression 
Regression number 12 13 
General grant -0.06 0.09 
 (-0.59) (1.02) 
Density 0.09 0.32 
 (0.43) (1.55) 
Unemployment benefits -0.00 0.01 
 (-0.83) (0.85) 
Ideology (left) 0.01 -0.04 
 (0.59) (-1.56) 
Concentration in council -0.04 -0.02 
 (-1.28) (-0.77) 
Coalition power in council 0.00 -0.02 
 (0.06) (-1.63) 
Pre-election year 0.01 0.02 
 (0.94) (1.02) 
Election year 0.05*** 0.01 
 (2.64) (0.23) 
Post-election year 0.03** 0.00 
 (2.51) (0.09) 
Average population per jurisdiction
 
0.01  




  (14.98) 
Year effects Yes Yes 
Municipal fixed effects  Yes Yes 
Municipal time trends Yes Yes 
Observations 1,542 1,542 
Municipalities 135 135 
R2 0.02 0.966 
Kleibergen-Paap F 224.5  
T-values between parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered by municipality. Variables are 
expressed in logs. * denotes significance at the 10% confidence level, ** significance at the 5% confidence 
level, and *** significance at the 1% confidence level.  
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Table 5: Regressions of total per capita spending with spatial lag; dynamic panel data model 
Control group All All All 
Balanced panel No Yes Yes 
Regression number 18 19 20 
Lagged dependent 0.65*** 0.64*** 0.62*** 
(35.02)  (31.89) (24.08) 
Spatial lag   0.10*** 
(3.67)    
Spatial lag on lagged dependent   0.05 
(1.48)   
General grant 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.13*** 
(2.76)  (2.96) (3.64) 
Population -0.36*** -0.41*** -0.41*** 
(4.92)  (-4.48) (-4.17) 
Density 0.16** 0.18** 0.21*** 
(2.67)  (2.14) (2.24) 
Unemployment -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.30) Benefits (-0.43) (-0.33) 
Ideology (left) -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
(0.81)  (-0.61) (0.30) 
Concentration  -0.02 -0.03* -0.04*** 
(2.73) in council (-1.46) (-1.94) 
Coalition power 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
(0.09) in council (0.05) (0.25) 
Pre-election year -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
(0.26)  (-0.12) (-0.22) 
Election year 0.02 0.02 0.02 
(0.32)  (0.84) (0.27) 
Post-election year 0.00 0.01 0.01 
(0.31)  (0.13) (0.46) 
Apre -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
(0.22)  (-1.24) (-0.22) 
A0-3 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 
(0.48)  (0.37) (-0.61) 
A4-10 0.02 -0.02 0.00 
(0.05)  (0.70) (-0.31) 
A11+ 0.03 -0.01 -0.00 
(0.02)  (0.93) (-0.26) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,983 2,717 2,717 
Municipalities 387 247 247 
Pseudo-R2 (within) 0.56 0.52  
T-values between parentheses. Variables are expressed in logs. * denotes significance at the 
10 percent confidence level, ** significance at the 5 percent confidence level, and *** 
significance at the 1 percent confidence level. 
 
7. Extended analysis 
Regardless of the chosen control group or regression model, no robust effect of amalgamation 
on total spending is found. This holds for all time periods around amalgamation, be it shortly 
before, shortly after or even in medium or long term after amalgamation. Amalgamations do 
not appear to affect municipal spending.  
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However, compared with those in other countries, Dutch municipalities are large. Perhaps 
economies of scale only exist in small municipalities. Moreover, as we have seen, the 
amalgamation effect might differ for municipalities with different characteristics, and this 
effect might even work in opposite directions for different amalgamations. Since our analysis 
so far concerns the aggregate effect, i.e., for all amalgamations, the result might reflect both 
positive and negative effects that cancel out. Therefore, we now test whether the 
amalgamation effect for small municipalities, where economies of scale are more likely, 
differs from that for large municipalities. We also study whether the amalgamation effect 
depends on preference heterogeneity, or on the number of amalgamating municipalities. 
As a second extension, we consider the possibility that economies of scale do not result in 
lower spending but in higher service levels. In that case, the amalgamation effect will not be 
observable in the total level of municipal spending, but should be observable in the 
composition thereof, or in the appreciation of local public services. We study both 
possibilities. 
Does amalgamation affect total spending of certain types of municipalities? 
In order to estimate the influence of population size on the amalgamation effect, we introduce 
four interaction dummies corresponding with our four amalgamation dummies. The results 
for the dynamic model and the static model with municipality trends are presented in 
Columns (21) and (22) of Table 6. None of the amalgamation dummies and none of the 
interaction variables have significant coefficients. The relevant effect, however, is the 
combined effect of both amalgamation and population, and cannot be read from the table 
directly. We present the combined effect in a figure. Scale effects are expected to be most 
relevant in the long run, so we focus on the A11+ dummy. Figure 4 presents the combined 
effect of this dummy and its interaction with population in the dynamic model.10 The vertical 
bars represent the number of municipalities observed in that population range, where we use 
intervals of 1,000. The amalgamation effect turns out not to vary with population size, and the 
slope of the marginal effect line is nearly horizontal. Thus, we find no indication of 
(dis)economies of scale for small (large) municipalities. Also, we see that the amalgamation 
effect is insignificant for the entire population range. This finding holds for other 
amalgamation dummies and control groups, as well as for the static model with municipality 
trends. 
  
                                            
10
 The marginal effect of amalgamation on per capita spending is calculated as β + βPopulation, where βis the 
coefficient of A11+ and β the coefficient of the interaction term Population*A11+. The standard error is given by 
%var(β) + Populationvar(β) + 2Population	cov(ββ). See, e.g., Brambor et al. (2006). 
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Table 6: Regression of total per capita spending; dynamic panel with interaction terms (control 
group: amalgamated or almost amalgamated) 
Interaction variable Population Difference in ideology 
of coalition 
Difference in ideology 
of council 
Model Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic 
Regression number 21 22 23 24 25 26 
Lagged dependent  0.47***  0.47***  0.47*** 
  (12.81)  (13.39)  (12.79) 
Apre -0.58 -0.11 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05* 
 (-1.31) (-0.20) (-1.31) (-1.25) (-1.37) (-1.80) 
A0-3 -0.56 -0.17 0.01 -0.00 -0.07 -0.04 
 (-0.86) (-0.27) (0.23) (-0.00) (-1.59) (-0.68) 
A4-10 -0.66 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 
 (-0.91) (0.03) (0.59) (0.14) (-1.07) (-0.38) 
A11+ -0.76 0.06 0.04 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 
 (-1.03) (0.09) (0.78) (0.27) (-0.95) (-0.34) 
Interaction with Apre 0.05 0.01 -0.08 0.04 -0.09 0.28* 
 (1.26) (0.14) (-1.31) (0.53) (-0.66) (1.71) 
Interaction with A0-3 0.05 0.02 -0.19 0.00 0.31 0.33 
 (0.82) (0.27) (-1.57) (0.01) (1.01) (1.02) 
Interaction with A4-10 0.06 -0.00 -0.22 -0.01 0.32 0.30 
 (0.90) (-0.02) (-1.37) (-0.03) (0.89) (0.73) 
Interaction with A11+ 0.07 -0.00 -0.20 -0.03 0.45 0.33 
 (1.05) (-0.07) (-1.16) (-0.14) (1.09) (0.79) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal time trends Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Observations 1,542 1,341 1,542 1,341 1,542 1,341 
Municipalities 135 135 135 135 135 135 
R2 (within) 0.64  0.64  0.65  
Pseudo-R2 (within)  0.52  0.46  0.46 
T-values between parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered by municipality. Variables are expressed in logs, 
except for the political difference variables. * denotes significance at the 10% confidence level, ** significance at the 5% 
confidence level, and *** significance at the 1% confidence level.  
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Figure 4. Marginal effect of amalgamation on total municipal spending, conditional on 
population, after eleven or more years (based on Column 22 of Table 6) 
 
 
To test whether preference heterogeneity affects amalgamation effects, we again use 
interaction variables. As an indicator for preference heterogeneity we use differences in 
political ideology of the parties governing the amalgamating jurisdictions. Ideology is 
measured as the share of left-wing parties on a scale from 0 to 1, as described above. 
Ideological difference is then calculated as the difference between the highest and the lowest 
value of ideology among jurisdictions in the year before they amalgamate. The results are 
given in Columns (23) and (24) of Table 6. None of the coefficients for the amalgamation 
dummies are significant, nor are those for the interaction variables. Graphs depicting the 
marginal effects for different amalgamation periods (not displayed) show no significant 
amalgamation effect for any range of ideological differences. When we use the ideology of 
the entire council instead of just that of the ruling coalition (Columns (25) and (26) of Table 
6), in the dynamic model, the coefficients for Apre and the corresponding interaction variable 
are weakly significant. Figure 5 shows the marginal effect for these variables in the dynamic 
model. Although we do observe an upward slope of the marginal effect, the 95% confidence 
interval shows that this is not significant.  
A last possible factor influencing the amalgamation effect is the number of amalgamating 
municipalities. Most amalgamations concern two or three jurisdictions. The number of 
observations for amalgamations of four or more municipalities is very low. Regressions 
testing whether the effect of amalgamating two jurisdictions differs from the effect of 
amalgamating three jurisdictions, show that this is not the case. 
Hence, we find no evidence suggesting that our failure to find a significant amalgamation 
effect on total spending is the result of averaging out counteracting effects for small and 
large, or homogeneous and heterogeneous, jurisdictions. The number of amalgamating 










































Figure 5. Marginal effect of amalgamation on total municipal spending before amalgamation, 
conditional on preference heterogeneity (based on Column 26 of Table 6) 
 
 
Changes in service levels 
Finally, it is conceivable that economies of scale do occur, but that they are not used to reduce 
spending but to increase public service levels. We investigate this by analyzing the 
composition of municipal spending, and the effect of amalgamation on house prices. 
The spending category where we would most expect economies of scale is administration. 
Spending on administration of Dutch municipalities includes remunerations for mayor, 
aldermen and members of the municipal council, and spending on staff and administrative 
support of these administrators and politicians. Amalgamations reduce the number of 
aldermen, council members and mayors. We do indeed find a significantly negative 
amalgamation effect on long run spending on administration in both the static and the 
dynamic model (Table 7). This points to economies of scale in this specific field. Any savings 
on administration might have been used on different spending categories, perhaps raising 
public service levels. However, as the share of administration in total spending is small (see 
Figure 3), it cannot be ruled out a priori that savings on administration have been used to 
reduce total spending, but that the effect is too small to be picked up by our regressions. 
If efficiency gains have been used to improve public services, one would expect higher 
spending levels in policy fields where spending is largely discretionary and aimed at 
providing services to the public. In the Netherlands, spending on many municipal tasks is 
driven by national guidelines or economic developments (e.g., welfare). In contrast, spending 
on culture & recreation is characterized by a large degree of freedom for local politicians. 
Moreover, this category consists of outlays for services that benefit citizens directly. In 
Columns (29) and (30) of Table 7 we present regressions with the share of spending on 








































Difference in ideology of the councils
Frequency Marginal effect 95% confidence interval
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effect of amalgamations on this share. In the static setting with municipality trends, we do 
find a positive effect immediately after amalgamation that borders on significance. There is 
no long term effect, though. We also investigated the effect of amalgamation on the shares of 
all eight other main spending categories. The dynamic model finds no significant increase 
anywhere, the static model only for Traffic & public transport.  
 
Table 7: Regressions of share of spending categories in total spending (control group: 
amalgamated or almost amalgamated) 
Dependent variable Share of administration Share of culture & recreation 
Model Static Dynamic Static Dynamic 
Regression number 27 28 29 30 
Lagged dependent  0.68***  0.61*** 
  (16.50)  (16.77) 
Apre 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 
 (0.21) (-0.20) (0.82) (0.49) 
A0-3 -0.22** -0.12 0.07* 0.03 
 (-2.08) (-1.62) (1.67) (0.78) 
A4-10 -0.24** -0.14* 0.06 0.02 
 (-2.17) (-1.75) (1.11) (0.49) 
A11+ -0.27** -0.18** 0.05 0.02 
 (-2.30) (-2.18) (0.96) (0.47) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal time trends Yes No Yes No 
Observations 1,515 1,311 1,514 1,309 
Municipalities 135 135 135 135 
Pseudo-R2 (within)  0.41  0.27 
R2 0.50  0.40  
T-values between parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered by municipality. Variables are expressed in 
logs. * denotes significance at the 10% confidence level, ** significance at the 5% confidence level, and *** 
significance at the 1% confidence level. 
 
By focusing on individual spending categories, we cannot observe a possible broader increase 
in the level of public services. Therefore, we also test whether house prices are affected by 
amalgamations. Rising house prices after amalgamation would support the improved public 
services hypothesis. As explained above, we first estimated average house prices which are 
corrected for differences in house characteristics. We next use this as the dependent variable 
in a regression with amalgamation dummies, fixed effects, year effects and individual 
municipality trends on the right hand side. Again, variables are expressed in logs.  
Table 8 shows that amalgamations do not raise house prices significantly. If anything, there is 
some weakly significant evidence of temporary negative amalgamation effects. Thus, we find 





Table 8: Regressions of average house price 
Control group Amalgamated 
or almost amalgamated 











Control variables No 
Year effects Yes 
Municipal fixed effects Yes 
Municipal time trends Yes 
Observations 1,464 
Municipalities 122 
R2 (within)  0.94 
T-values between parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered by 
municipality. Variables are expressed in logs. * denotes significance at the 10% 
confidence level, ** significance at the 5% confidence level, and *** 
significance at the 1% confidence level. 
 
8. Conclusions 
This paper studies the effects of amalgamation on spending and on service levels of Dutch 
municipalities. We use different control groups and econometric models and include spatial 
spending interaction to check the robustness of our results. Our study consistently finds that 
there is no significant effect on total per capita municipal spending before or after 
amalgamation. 
However, this result in itself does not mean that amalgamation does not affect local 
government spending. We test two hypotheses that might explain the absence of an effect on 
total per capita spending. First, amalgamation may have different effects on municipalities 
with different characteristics. Such effects might work in opposite directions for different 
amalgamations, resulting in the absence of an aggregate effect. Secondly, it is possible that 
economies of scale do exist, but that these do not result in lower spending but in higher 
service levels.  
We examine the influence of three municipal characteristics on the amalgamation effect: 
population size, preference heterogeneity and number of amalgamating jurisdictions. We 
would expect economies of scale to be most likely in small municipalities. However, we find 
that the influence of population size on the amalgamation effect is not significant. Thus, even 
in small jurisdictions, amalgamation does not reduce spending. Preference heterogeneity 
might drive up spending if local governments adapt the level of each public service to the 
level of the municipality that had the highest standard in that field before amalgamation. To 
test this, we interact amalgamation dummies with a measure of political heterogeneity. 
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However, we find no evidence of a significant influence of political heterogeneity on the 
amalgamation effect. Finally, we test whether amalgamating two jurisdictions affects 
spending differently than amalgamating three jurisdictions. This is not the case.  
The second hypothesis involves the possibility that amalgamations do in fact result in 
efficiency gains, but that these are used to raise public service levels, not to reduce 
expenditures. We test this by first examining different spending categories and then analyzing 
the effect of amalgamation on house prices. 
The spending category most likely to exhibit economies of scale is administration. 
Amalgamation reduces the per capita number of administrators and politicians, and, 
presumably, of their staff. We do indeed find that, in the long term, spending on 
administration is significantly reduced by amalgamation. These savings may have been used 
to improve public services. In that case we would expect a corresponding rise in the share of 
spending on culture & recreation, which is largely discretionary instead of driven by national 
regulations, and associated with public services that benefit citizens directly. However, we do 
not find such a rise of spending, nor on culture & recreation, nor on any other spending 
category. 
To further study the hypothesis that amalgamation increases service levels, we test whether 
amalgamation raises house prices. Increasing service levels at constant per capita spending 
would make a municipality more attractive to live in, which we would expect to capitalize 
into house prices. However, the effect of amalgamation on house prices is only weakly 
significant. Moreover, it is negative instead of positive. 
Our study has three main conclusions. First, we find no robust evidence of an effect of 
amalgamation on aggregate municipal spending. Neither an increase nor a decrease of 
spending can be observed either before or after amalgamation. Secondly, we find no evidence 
that economies of scale do in fact occur, but only for amalgamations of small jurisdictions, or 
jurisdictions with homogeneous preferences. Thirdly, we find no evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that amalgamations generate economies of scale, but that these are used to raise 
service levels, not to reduce spending.  
These results do not imply that amalgamation of local government is always inadvisable. 
They do imply, however, that economies of scale should not be taken for granted, that 
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